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DebtCovenantViolations of
Private Lending Agreements of
Agricultural Cooperatives
Frank MichaelMessina
Seven years of debt covenant violations of private lending agreements of eighty-three ag-
ricultural cooperatives were examined. A LOGIT prediction model of debt covenant viola-
tions was developedand the factors thataffect debtcovenantviolationswereidentified. These
factors include cooperative size, working capital, the quick ratio, the existence of a manage-
ment compensation plan, the tax-exempt status of the cooperative, a bank rating, and the
current amount of loan payments.
Ina recent perspective on private lending agreements, Smith (1993) called for
a clearer understanding of debt covenant violations. However, obtaining access
to dataonsuchagreementsis often difficultbecauseofconfidentiality. Following
Smith's recommendation and supported by CoBank
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Background and Prior Research
In obtaining external funding, a cooperative agrees to abide by certain debt
covenantsestablishedbythe outsidelendinginstitution. Examplesincludelimits
placedonfixed assetpurchasesandcashpatronagerefunds. Thesecovenantsare
necessary because the debtor firm has incentives to take actions thatmay nega-
tively affect the wealth position of the debtholder (Duke and Hunt 1990).
The problem facing cooperatives is that some will violate their debt covenant
restrictions. These violations are costly (Beneish and Press 1993; Chen and Wei
1993) andcanhaveadverse consequencesfor the cooperative.
2This studysought
to determinewhatfactors cause these violations to occur.
Itmustbe noted, however, that the inclusion of these covenants inloan agree-
ments does not ensure that cooperatives will abide by the agreements or that
conflicts between the lender and borrower will be completely resolved. In fact,
Foster (1986) contends thatdebt restrictions are bestviewed as the openingrules
of the lendinggame,withboththe creditorandborrowerrecognizingthatnotall
violations result inactual adverse consequences to theborrower.
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AgencyTheory
Agencytheorymaybeusedtoexplainwhydebtcovenantrestrictionsareplaced
in lending agreements. The basic supposition of this theory is that agency costs
arisebecauseallpartiesactintheirownself-interests(Watts andZimmerman1979).
Lendingagreementslimitthefinancing andinvestingdecisionsofborrowingfirms
becauseofthis conflictofinterestben-veen debtholdersandstockholders. Decisions
inthebestinterests of theborrowerare notalways in thebestinterestsofthe credi-
tor (Leftwich 1981). These managerial, financing, and investing decisions are usu-
ally madeinfavor ofthe stockholderattheexpense of the debtholder (Holthausen
and Leftwich 1983). Examples of activities that can cause a shift of wealth or that
favor the stockholder over the debtholder include payment of dividends, incur-
rence of additional debt, maintenance of working capital, and merger activity
(Leftwich 1981). As noted earlier, creditors are somewhat able to control these ac-
tivities byplacing debt covenantrestrictions inlending agreements.
Prior Studies
The empirical results of a recent study by EI-Gazzar and Pastena (1991) con-
firm that the number and "tightness" of debt covenants placed in loan agree-
ments depend on the financial position of the firm. They found that firms with
higherindebtednesshadless bargainingpowerandwereforced to accepttighter
restrictions. Infact, the greater the debt, the higher thenumberofrestrictions. EI-
Gazzar and Pastena (1991) also found that larger firms with greater resources
werebetterable toavoid debtcovenantviolation, and thuswereable to negotiate
agreements withfewer restrictions.
Ineconomic consequence studies,HolthausenandLeftwich (1983) and Press and
Weintrop (1990) found that size and leverage are the most significant contracting
factors. Holthausen and Leftwich (1983) also found that a variable indicating the
existence ofa managementcompensationplanis a usefulproxy for agency costs.
Backer and Gosman (1979) conducted in-depth interviews with twenty-four
major banks' executives to determine which financial ratios are being used in
making commercial lending decisions. They learned that the quick ratio is an
importantcommercial lending factor.
Castle (1980) examined thirty-seven commercial lending agreements and
found that leverage and working capital restrictions are the most frequently
used debt covenants. He also noted that the type and number of covenants de-
pend on the company's credit standing, the nature of its business, and the type
of loan requested.
DukeandHunt(1990) examinedtherelationshipofseveraldebt/equityproxiesto
debt covenant restrictions. They were able to identify the existence and capture the





sonallines of credit (short-term loans). Both types of loans usually possess the
same combination of debt covenant restrictions. The seasonal lines of credit are
re-negotiated yearly, while the term loans are not re-negotiated unless the debt
covenant restrictions have been violated. CoBank loans are usually secured by
the cooperatives' assets.Debt CovenantViolations/Messina 31
Therearebasicallytwoclassificationsofcooperativedebtcovenants,negativeand
affirmative. Negative covenants impede an action-such as paying dividends-if
certainrequirements are notmet. According to Frostand Bernard (1989), a technical
violationoccurs onlyifthe creditor takessometypeofaction. Anexample ofa viola-
tion of a negative covenant would be if a cooperative simply decided to distribute
more cash patronage refunds than were allowed by the creditor in the loan agree-
ment. This violation would trigger the creditor to take action. The action may be as
simple as noting the violation and waiving it, or the action may result in real eco-
nomic consequences to the cooperative. Requirements that specify floors orceilings
are termed affirmative covenants. Whenthe floor orceiling limitis exceeded, a debt
covenant violation automatically occurs. For example, a working capital restriction
thatestablishes a minimumamountofworkingcapitalis anaffirmative covenant.
Sample and Methodology
As noted previously, CoBank provided the financial data in this study, grant-
ing access to the cooperatives' debt covenant files. The sample consists of seven
years of financial data and the terms of private lending agreements on eighty-
three agricultural cooperatives whose yearly sales average approximately $9.5
million. The sample data period for seventy-six of the cooperatives is from 1985
to1991,withtheexceptionofsevencooperativesofthe eighty-three,to whichthe
participatinglendinginstitutionnolongerlends. The initialperiod ofthose seven
cooperatives varies from 1982 to 1984.
CoBankmaintaineddetailed loanhistoriesfor thecooperativesincludedinthe
sample. Debtcovenantviolations andthecorrespondingdates ofoccurrencewere
identified from correspondence between both CoBank (creditor) and the coop-
eratives. Analysis of the private lending agreements of each of the eighty-three
cooperativesfor the seven years revealed seventy-nine actualdebtcovenantvio-
lations and 502 cases where no violation occurred, a total sample size of581 ob-
servations. Table 1 lists the debt covenant violations discovered and indicates
whethereach involved a negative or affirmative covenant.
A primary objective of this research studywas to determine whichvariables, if
any, areusefulinpredictingtheviolationofdebtcovenantrestrictionsbythecoop-
eratives. Constructing a statisticalmodelfor this purpose allows the prediction of
TABLE I. Debt CovenantViolations.
Negative Covenant Violations
Exceeded Fixed Asset Purchases Limit
Exceeded Dividend/Cash Patronage Payout
Retired Stock/Equity Without Permission
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effects on the dependent variable resulting from changes in one or more of the
independent (predictor) variables. For this research study, the dependent vari-
able was depictedbya 'a' for no debtcovenantviolationand a 'I'for violation of
at least one debt covenantrestriction.
Statistical~e~od
For studies where dichotomous choices are considered (for example: violate/do
notviolate, capitalize/do notcapitalize), Maddala (1991) suggests the use of the bi-
nary LOGIT model. Maddala states that for accounting studies, the logit method is
the preferred overthe linearprobabilitymodeland multiple discriminant analysis.
TheBinary LOGIT ~odel
The binaryLOCITmodelassumes that the probability of a cooperative select-
inga particularalternativeis basedonthecharacteristicsofthatcooperative. More-
over, because the cooperative is assumed to be a utility maximizer, it will choose
the alternative that provides the highest level ofutility.
Utility is made up ofdeterministic and random components and is expressed
as follows:
U =V + e n n n
where
Un =utility for cooperative n,
Vn =deterministic component of utility for cooperative n,
en =random component of utility for cooperative n.
(1)
The deterministiccomponentofutility is specified as a linear, additive combi-
nation of the value of debt covenant attributes ofthe cooperative:
Vn =I;\=1 WkXkn (2)
where
Xkn =value ofattribute k of cooperative n,
Wk =importance of attribute k (estimated parameters),
k = 1,2,...,K attributes.
For binary LOCIT, the error terms of utility are specified to be independently
andidenticallydistributedwiththeType Iextremevaluedistribution. Thebinary
LOCITmodel form is as follows:
1
Pm
1 + exp -(Vn)
(3)
where
Pin =probabilitythat alternative i (violation) is chosen by cooperative n.
Selection ofVariables
Foster (1986) notes that quantitative models in the lending process should be
developed for all industries and suggests examining past research on loans and
pastexperienceofthe particularlendinginstitution. Inselectingvariables for this
study,variablesfrompriorresearchwereused,aswellas thosesuggestedbyloan
officers at CoBank.Debt CovenantViolations/Messina 33
It is expected, based on prior studies (Holthausen and Leftwich [1983] and
Pressand Weintrop [1990]), thatmeasuresfor size andleveragewillbe goodpre-
dictors of debtcovenantviolations. Inthis study, size is measuredbytotal assets,
while the debt-to-equity ratio serves as the proxy for leverage (e.g. Duke and
Hunt [1990] andPressandWeintrop [1990]). Otherindependentvariablesinclude
working capital, the quick ratio, and a dummy indicator for the existence of a
management compensationplan (exists =1).
According to CoBank, other variables that should prove useful in the predic-
tion ofviolations include cooperative current-year payments to CoBank, tax sta-
tus (exempt =0, non-exempt=I), and an overall rating (bad =I, average =2, or
good =3) based ontheexperiences ofloan officers. Inits bankrating ofthecoop-
erative, CoBank notes three mainfactors thatdemonstrate anattractive coopera-
tive. They include superior performance in (1) management, (2) control over ac-
counts receivable, and (3) financial position.
Expected Signs
The expected sign of total assets is negative since the likelihood of violation
decreases with cooperative size. As EI-Cazzar and Pastena (1991) have shown,
larger companies are less likely to violate debt covenants because their greater
resources enable them to avoid default.
The expected sign of the debt-to-equity ratio is positive. Here, the tighter re-
strictions are believed to accompany greater levels of debt, thus increasing the
probability that the cooperative will violate the covenants.
For the liquidity measures, workingcapitaland the quickratio, the expectedsign
is negative since a greater ability to meet current needs reduces the probability of
violation. The expected signofthe existence of a managementcompensationplanis
positivesincemanagersmayviolatedebtcovenantstosatisfycompensationbonuses.
The expected sign for payments to CoBank is positive. As argued by EI-Cazzar
and Pastena (1991), the greater the debt, the higherthe numberofrestrictions. More
restrictionscouldleadto moreviolations. Theexpectedsignfor the tax statusindica-
torisnegative.AccordingtoCoBank, tax-exemptcooperativeswillviolatecovenants
more frequently since the cooperatives are smaller and often lack strong manage-
ment control and record keeping. Accordingly, these conditions may lead to more
violations. Theexpectedsignoftheloanofficerratingsis alsonegativesincecoopera-
tives that receive higher ratings should less oftencommitcovenantviolations.
Analyses and Findings
Binary LOGIT Model Results
Table 2presents the parameter estimates, asymptotic standard errors, t-statis-
tics, expected signs ofthe independentvariables, and goodness-of-fit statistics of
the LOCIT model.
Binary LOGIT Model's Goodness-of-Fit
The Chi-square statistic is used to test the overall goodness-of-fitof thebinary
LOCIT model. Here, the test statistic is 26.1, which is significant at the .001 level.
The LikelihoodRatio testis used tomeasure thegoodness-of-fitfor themodel.As
canbe seen from table 2, thebinary LOCIT model is significant at .001.
The fit of the binary LOCIT model can be evaluated by examining the calcu-
latedRho-squarestatisticof.4674 from table 2. This statisticexceedstheMcFadden
(1986) requirement of .20 as the threshold for adequate fit.34 Journal of Cooperatives 1996
TABLE 2. Estimation Results ofthe Binary Logit Model.
Variable Parameter Estimate Standard Error t-Statistic Exp. Sign
TOTASTS .00000004139 .00000002348 1.76
b
DEBTTOEQ .00997 .0132 .75 +
WC -.000000213 .0000001262 1.69b
QUICK -.3121 .1602 1.95b
MGTCOMP .4487 .3011 1.49' +
TAXEMP -.6708 .2861 2.35'
RATING -.6959 .1158 6.00d













'Significant at 0.10 level or less, two-tailed test.
bSignificant at 0.05 level or less, two-tailed test.
'Significant at 0.025 level or less, two-tailed test.
'Significant at 0.001 level or less, two-tailed test.
SignsofParameter Estimates
The apriorisigns of seven of the eight variables displayed in table 2 are con-
firmed. Total assets (TOTASTS), however does not carry the expected sign. This
result may be unique to the lending environment between larger cooperatives
andCoBank. The largerborrowersfrom CoBank mayfeel thatthey areCoBank's
biggest customers and can violate withoutfear ofeconomic consequences.
Individual Parameters
The t-statistic is used in a two-tailed test of significance for each parameter
(Aldrich and Nelson 1984). As evident in table 2, seven of the eight variables
exhibita significancelevelofatleast.10. Onlythedebt-to-equityratio(DEBTTOEQ)
lackssignificance. Thus, eachofthesevensignificantvariablesinfluences thelike-
lihood of debtcovenantviolation.
Specifically, totalassets (TOTASTS), theexistenceofa managementcompensa-
tionplan(MGTCOMP), andcurrentyear's paymentsto CoBank (PYMTSBC) are
positive influences, while the working capital (WC) quick ratio (QUICK), tax-
exempt status (TAXEMP), and bankrating (RATING) are negativeinfluences on
debt covenant violation.
Classification Accuracy ofthe Binary LOGIT Model
The parametersobtainedfrom the estimationdatasetofbinaryLOGIT model,
as shownintable 2, haveanoverallpredictiveaccuracy of.8726. Thus, themodel
appears to be a good predictor ofdebt covenantviolation.
Table 3 displays the accuracy of the binary LOGIT model in predicting non-
violationsandviolationsseparately. Themodelaccuratelypredicts87.45% ofnon-
violations and 86.08% ofviolations.Debt CovenantViolations!Messina


















Because the parameters (£5) show changes inlog-odds, theirelasticities (eB) are
moreusefulfor interpretivepurposes.Theseelasticitiesconvertthelog-oddprob-
abilities to a one-unit change factor. Table 4 displays the parameter, values, and
elasticities.
For example, for QUICK, the exponentiated parameter is .7319, which indi-
cates that a one unit change in the quick ratio will cause a .7319 unit change in
violation. The other elasticities canbe interpreted similarly.
TABLE 4. Parameter Elasticities ofLogit Model










by CoBank formed the basis for this research study. The LOCIT model developed
appears to be a good predictor of debt covenant violations and non-violations. A
goodpredictive model of debt covenantviolations is important in thatthe ability to
know the probability of violation could enable the lender and/or the borrower to
preventthe violationand thus avoid adverse consequences to the cooperative.
Factorsthatinfluencedebtcovenantviolationswereidentifiedandinclude: (1)
the size of the cooperative, (2) the amount of working capital of the cooperative,
(3) the quickratio of thecooperative, (4) the existence of a managementcompen-
sation plan, (5) whethera cooperative is tax-exemptornot, (6) the bankratingof
the cooperative, and (7) the amount ofcurrentpayments to CoBank.
Itshouldbe noted thatthis is the first study that hasattempted to develop a pre-
dictive model for debtcovenantviolations ofcooperatives. As such, the influencing
factors used in the model should be interpreted with caution. Several of the factors36 Journal of Cooperatives 1996
may be interrelated. For example, loan officer rating may be based in part on
accounts receivableandfinancial position, and,assuch,couldberelatedto work-
ing capital and the debt-to-equity ratio. The same is true of the quick ratio and
working capital. Similarly, the variable for tax-exempt cooperatives, which are
usually smaller cooperatives, may partly be related to the variable for size (total
assets).
Another limitation of the study is that, given thenon-random selection of the
sample, the results may not be predictive of all agricultural cooperatives. Also,
giventheuniqueform ofvestedinterestinCoBank (creditor) bythe cooperatives
(borrower), these results may not be generalizable to private lending arrange-
ments of other banks, where the borrowers do not hold vested interests in the
banks.
Nevertheless, thisis the first knownstudythatexamines actual debtcovenant
violations of private lending agreements of agricultural cooperatives. Thus, this
study contributes to the knowledge base for debt covenant violations of private
lendingagreementsandshouldbeusefulfor future researcherswhowishtowork
inthearea. Also, thisstudyshouldbeofinterestto otherexternalparties(lenders,
managers, and owners) inevaluating cooperative loan agreementviolations.
Notes
1. CoBank is a federally chartered and regulatedbankof the FarmCreditSystem. With
over $16 billion in assets, it is ownedbyapproximately twenty-three hundred stockhold-
ers, consisting of agricultural cooperatives, rural utility systems, and other businesses
that serve rural America (CoBank 1994).
2. Examples includea calling ofthe loan, a reduction in the cooperative's seasonal line
of credit, and/or a renegotiation of the loan at a higher interest rate.
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